security: authorize and validate presigned upload requests
POST /api/v1/uploads minted an upload key from caller input with no ownership check, no content-type allowlist, and the raw filename interpolated into the S3 key. - Ownership: a caller may only mint upload URLs for a route/activity they own, enforced via the branded loadOwnedRoute/loadOwnedActivity (404 on miss, no existence leak). Closes writing into another user's resource key-space. - Content type: the request schema now constrains contentType to an image/gpx allowlist, so active content (HTML/SVG/JS) that would execute if served inline is rejected at the request boundary. - Filename: sanitizeUploadFilename() reduces the client filename to a safe basename (charset-restricted, no path components, no leading dots, length-bounded) before it becomes part of the key. Tests: schema allow/deny + filename sanitization in @trails-cool/api; handler tests covering owned-success, not-owner 404, disallowed content-type, and the route-vs-activity ownership branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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5 changed files with 203 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -55,5 +55,6 @@ export {
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// Uploads
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export {
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PresignedUploadRequestSchema, PresignedUploadResponseSchema,
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ALLOWED_UPLOAD_CONTENT_TYPES, sanitizeUploadFilename,
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type PresignedUploadRequest, type PresignedUploadResponse,
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} from "./uploads.ts";
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63
packages/api/src/uploads.test.ts
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63
packages/api/src/uploads.test.ts
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@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
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import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
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import {
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PresignedUploadRequestSchema,
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sanitizeUploadFilename,
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} from "./uploads.ts";
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const ROUTE_ID = "11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111";
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describe("PresignedUploadRequestSchema", () => {
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it("accepts an allowed content type", () => {
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const r = PresignedUploadRequestSchema.safeParse({
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filename: "photo.jpg",
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contentType: "image/jpeg",
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resourceType: "activity",
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resourceId: ROUTE_ID,
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});
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expect(r.success).toBe(true);
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});
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it("rejects active/disallowed content types", () => {
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for (const contentType of ["text/html", "image/svg+xml", "application/javascript"]) {
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const r = PresignedUploadRequestSchema.safeParse({
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filename: "x", contentType, resourceType: "route", resourceId: ROUTE_ID,
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});
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expect(r.success, contentType).toBe(false);
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}
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});
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it("rejects a non-uuid resourceId and empty filename", () => {
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expect(PresignedUploadRequestSchema.safeParse({
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filename: "a.png", contentType: "image/png", resourceType: "route", resourceId: "nope",
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}).success).toBe(false);
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expect(PresignedUploadRequestSchema.safeParse({
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filename: "", contentType: "image/png", resourceType: "route", resourceId: ROUTE_ID,
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}).success).toBe(false);
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});
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});
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describe("sanitizeUploadFilename", () => {
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it("strips path components (no traversal into the key)", () => {
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("../../etc/passwd")).toBe("passwd");
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("/abs/path/img.png")).toBe("img.png");
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("a\\b\\c.jpg")).toBe("c.jpg");
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});
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it("restricts to a conservative charset and collapses runs", () => {
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("my photo (1)!.jpg")).toBe("my_photo_1_.jpg");
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});
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it("strips leading dots so dotfiles / .. can't form the segment", () => {
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("...hidden")).toBe("hidden");
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("..")).toBe("upload");
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});
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it("never returns empty", () => {
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("")).toBe("upload");
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("////")).toBe("upload");
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});
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it("bounds the length", () => {
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expect(sanitizeUploadFilename("a".repeat(500)).length).toBeLessThanOrEqual(128);
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});
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});
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@ -1,12 +1,40 @@
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import { z } from "zod";
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/**
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* Content types accepted for uploads. Constrained so a caller can't
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* stash active content (HTML/SVG/JS) that would execute if the object
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* were ever served inline. Keep in sync with what the upload UI sends.
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*/
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export const ALLOWED_UPLOAD_CONTENT_TYPES = [
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"image/jpeg",
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"image/png",
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"image/webp",
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"image/gif",
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"application/gpx+xml",
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] as const;
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export const PresignedUploadRequestSchema = z.object({
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filename: z.string(),
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contentType: z.string(),
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filename: z.string().min(1).max(255),
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contentType: z.enum(ALLOWED_UPLOAD_CONTENT_TYPES),
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resourceType: z.enum(["route", "activity"]),
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resourceId: z.uuid(),
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});
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/**
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* Reduce a client-supplied filename to a safe S3 object-key segment:
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* basename only (drop any path), restrict to a conservative charset,
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* collapse runs, strip leading dots, and bound the length. Never empty.
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*/
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export function sanitizeUploadFilename(filename: string): string {
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const base = filename.split(/[/\\]/).pop() ?? "";
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const cleaned = base
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.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, "_")
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.replace(/_{2,}/g, "_")
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.replace(/^\.+/, "")
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.slice(0, 128);
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return cleaned.length > 0 ? cleaned : "upload";
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}
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export const PresignedUploadResponseSchema = z.object({
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uploadUrl: z.url(),
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storageKey: z.string(),
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