fix(journal): single-use JWT enforcement for route callback tokens (#2 Phase B)

After Phase A (#442) moved the journal callback token off the browser,
the token was still replayable on the wire until \`exp\` (7 days). This
PR makes each token strictly single-use.

Changes:

- **\`journal.consumed_jwt_jti\` table** — \`jti TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
  consumed_at TIMESTAMPTZ, expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ\`. Picked up by
  drizzle-kit push on deploy.
- **\`createRouteToken\` now sets a \`jti\` claim** (\`randomUUID()\`).
- **\`verifyRouteToken\` atomically consumes the jti** via
  \`INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING jti\`. Postgres
  serializes the insert, so exactly one concurrent caller wins; the
  rest see an empty result and throw \`TokenAlreadyConsumedError\`.
  Tokens without a \`jti\` claim (i.e. minted before this PR) are
  also rejected — the right call: any in-flight legacy token sitting
  in a planner session is replayable, and we'd rather fail-loud than
  silently grandfather them in.
- **\`consumed-jti-sweep\` job** — daily 03:45 UTC cron that
  \`DELETE WHERE expires_at < now()\`. Keeps the table tiny; offset
  from the other purge jobs to spread load.
- **e2e replay test** — \`integration.test.ts\` now exercises a
  same-token double-submit and asserts the second returns 401 with
  \`/consumed|already/i\`.

UX implication worth flagging: a user who clicks \"Save\" twice (or whose
network retries a failed POST) sees an error on the second attempt.
They go back to the journal for a fresh \"Edit in Planner\" link.

Full repo: pnpm typecheck / lint / test all green (177 + 31 integration).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ullrich Schäfer 2026-05-26 00:38:08 +02:00
parent c525240d0e
commit b4c64a40e7
No known key found for this signature in database
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5 changed files with 115 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
import type { JobDefinition } from "@trails-cool/jobs";
import { lt } from "drizzle-orm";
import { consumedJwtJti } from "@trails-cool/db/schema/journal";
import { getDb } from "../lib/db.ts";
import { logger } from "../lib/logger.server.ts";
/**
* Daily cleanup for the JWT replay-protection table. Each row was
* inserted by `verifyRouteToken` to mark a token as consumed; once
* the token's `exp` claim has passed, the row is no longer useful
* (the JWT itself would fail signature verification before reaching
* the consume step). Bound the table to keep it tiny.
*
* See planner-audit #2 Phase B.
*/
export const consumedJtiSweepJob: JobDefinition = {
name: "consumed-jti-sweep",
cron: "45 3 * * *", // daily at 03:45 UTC (offset from notifications-purge)
retryLimit: 1,
expireInSeconds: 60,
async handler() {
const db = getDb();
const result = await db
.delete(consumedJwtJti)
.where(lt(consumedJwtJti.expiresAt, new Date()))
.returning({ jti: consumedJwtJti.jti });
const purged = result.length;
logger.info({ purged }, "consumed-jti-sweep");
return { purged };
},
};

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@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
import { SignJWT, jwtVerify } from "jose"; import { SignJWT, jwtVerify } from "jose";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { getOrigin, requireSecret } from "./config.server.ts"; import { getOrigin, requireSecret } from "./config.server.ts";
import { getDb } from "./db.ts";
import { consumedJwtJti } from "@trails-cool/db/schema/journal";
const JWT_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode( const JWT_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
requireSecret("JWT_SECRET", "dev-jwt-secret-change-in-production"), requireSecret("JWT_SECRET", "dev-jwt-secret-change-in-production"),
@ -13,14 +16,57 @@ export async function createRouteToken(routeId: string, permissions: string[] =
.setIssuer(ISSUER) .setIssuer(ISSUER)
.setExpirationTime("7d") .setExpirationTime("7d")
.setIssuedAt() .setIssuedAt()
.setJti(randomUUID())
.sign(JWT_SECRET); .sign(JWT_SECRET);
} }
export class TokenAlreadyConsumedError extends Error {
constructor() {
super("Token already consumed");
this.name = "TokenAlreadyConsumedError";
}
}
/**
* Verify a route token AND atomically consume it. Subsequent calls
* with the same token throw `TokenAlreadyConsumedError`.
*
* The consume step is `INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING RETURNING jti`.
* Postgres serializes the insert against concurrent attempts, so
* exactly one caller observes the returned row the rest see an
* empty result and reject.
*
* Tokens minted before this PR (no `jti` claim) are rejected outright,
* which is the right behavior: pre-existing tokens are already in
* planner-session DB rows and would be replayable if accepted. The
* user re-saves by going back to the journal for a fresh token.
*/
export async function verifyRouteToken(token: string): Promise<{ routeId: string; permissions: string[] }> { export async function verifyRouteToken(token: string): Promise<{ routeId: string; permissions: string[] }> {
const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_SECRET, { const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_SECRET, {
issuer: ISSUER, issuer: ISSUER,
}); });
if (typeof payload.jti !== "string" || !payload.jti) {
throw new TokenAlreadyConsumedError();
}
if (typeof payload.exp !== "number") {
throw new TokenAlreadyConsumedError();
}
const db = getDb();
const inserted = await db
.insert(consumedJwtJti)
.values({
jti: payload.jti,
expiresAt: new Date(payload.exp * 1000),
})
.onConflictDoNothing()
.returning({ jti: consumedJwtJti.jti });
if (inserted.length === 0) {
throw new TokenAlreadyConsumedError();
}
return { return {
routeId: payload.route_id as string, routeId: payload.route_id as string,
permissions: payload.permissions as string[], permissions: payload.permissions as string[],

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@ -176,8 +176,9 @@ server.listen(port, async () => {
const { komootBulkImportJob } = await import("./app/jobs/komoot-bulk-import.ts"); const { komootBulkImportJob } = await import("./app/jobs/komoot-bulk-import.ts");
const { importBatchesSweepJob } = await import("./app/jobs/import-batches-sweep.ts"); const { importBatchesSweepJob } = await import("./app/jobs/import-batches-sweep.ts");
const { sendWelcomeEmailJob } = await import("./app/jobs/send-welcome-email.ts"); const { sendWelcomeEmailJob } = await import("./app/jobs/send-welcome-email.ts");
const { consumedJtiSweepJob } = await import("./app/jobs/consumed-jti-sweep.ts");
// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
jobs.push(notificationsFanoutJob, notificationsPurgeJob, komootBulkImportJob as any, importBatchesSweepJob, sendWelcomeEmailJob); jobs.push(notificationsFanoutJob, notificationsPurgeJob, komootBulkImportJob as any, importBatchesSweepJob, sendWelcomeEmailJob, consumedJtiSweepJob);
const boss = createBoss(getDatabaseUrl()); const boss = createBoss(getDatabaseUrl());
await startWorker(boss, jobs); await startWorker(boss, jobs);

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@ -71,6 +71,28 @@ test.describe("Integration: Planner callback → geometry stored", () => {
}); });
expect(resp.status()).toBe(401); expect(resp.status()).toBe(401);
}); });
test("token is single-use — second submit is rejected (Phase B replay guard)", async ({ request }) => {
const seedResp = await request.post(`${JOURNAL}/api/e2e/seed`);
const { routeId, token } = await seedResp.json() as { routeId: string; token: string };
// First save succeeds.
const first = await request.post(`${JOURNAL}/api/routes/${routeId}/callback`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
data: { gpx: VALID_GPX },
});
expect(first.status()).toBe(200);
// Second attempt with the *same* token must fail — the jti has
// been consumed.
const second = await request.post(`${JOURNAL}/api/routes/${routeId}/callback`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
data: { gpx: VALID_GPX },
});
expect(second.status()).toBe(401);
const body = await second.json() as { error: string };
expect(body.error).toMatch(/consumed|already/i);
});
}); });
test.describe("Integration: Journal ↔ Planner handoff", () => { test.describe("Integration: Journal ↔ Planner handoff", () => {

View file

@ -356,3 +356,17 @@ export const notifications = journalSchema.table("notifications", {
.on(t.recipientUserId, t.type, t.subjectId) .on(t.recipientUserId, t.type, t.subjectId)
.where(sql`${t.subjectId} IS NOT NULL`), .where(sql`${t.subjectId} IS NOT NULL`),
})); }));
// Single-use JWT enforcement for callback tokens (planner → journal
// save flow). Each token carries a `jti` claim; the verifier inserts
// into this table on first use. A second attempt hits the PK conflict
// and the verifier rejects the token. Rows are swept after `expires_at`.
// See spec / planner-audit #2 Phase B.
export const consumedJwtJti = journalSchema.table("consumed_jwt_jti", {
jti: text("jti").primaryKey(),
consumedAt: timestamp("consumed_at", { withTimezone: true }).notNull().defaultNow(),
expiresAt: timestamp("expires_at", { withTimezone: true }).notNull(),
}, (t) => ({
// Sweep runs `DELETE WHERE expires_at < now()` on a daily schedule.
expiresAtIdx: index("consumed_jwt_jti_expires_at_idx").on(t.expiresAt),
}));