Fix picomatch audit vulnerability and complete security hardening verification
Override picomatch to 4.0.4 to resolve high-severity ReDoS (GHSA-c2c7-rcm5-vvqj), verify all security hardening tasks (gitleaks, pnpm audit, Docker non-root, Caddy headers, scanner blocking), sync specs, and archive the change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
433886772f
commit
b6908fb288
10 changed files with 604 additions and 28 deletions
59
openspec/specs/security-hardening/spec.md
Normal file
59
openspec/specs/security-hardening/spec.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
|
|||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Security response headers
|
||||
All HTTP responses SHALL include security headers to protect against common web attacks.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: HSTS header
|
||||
- **WHEN** a browser receives a response from trails.cool
|
||||
- **THEN** the response includes `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload`
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Content sniffing prevention
|
||||
- **WHEN** a browser receives a response
|
||||
- **THEN** the response includes `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Clickjacking prevention
|
||||
- **WHEN** a browser receives a response
|
||||
- **THEN** the response includes `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Scanner path blocking
|
||||
Known vulnerability scanner paths SHALL be blocked at the reverse proxy level before reaching the application.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Env file scanner
|
||||
- **WHEN** a request is made to `/.env`, `/.env.local`, `/.env.prod`, or similar paths
|
||||
- **THEN** Caddy returns 403 without forwarding to the application
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Git config scanner
|
||||
- **WHEN** a request is made to `/.git/config` or `/.git/HEAD`
|
||||
- **THEN** Caddy returns 403 without forwarding to the application
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Secret scanning in CI
|
||||
The CI pipeline SHALL scan commits for accidentally committed secrets.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Secret detected
|
||||
- **WHEN** a PR contains a committed API key, token, or password
|
||||
- **THEN** the CI pipeline fails with a clear message indicating the leaked secret
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Known public values allowed
|
||||
- **WHEN** a known-public value (e.g., Sentry DSN) is committed
|
||||
- **THEN** gitleaks allows it via the `.gitleaks.toml` allowlist
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Dependency vulnerability scanning
|
||||
The CI pipeline SHALL check for known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: High severity vulnerability
|
||||
- **WHEN** a dependency has a high or critical vulnerability advisory
|
||||
- **THEN** the CI pipeline fails
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Non-root Docker containers
|
||||
Application containers SHALL run as a non-root user.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Container user
|
||||
- **WHEN** a container starts
|
||||
- **THEN** the process runs as a non-root user (not UID 0)
|
||||
|
||||
### Requirement: Vulnerability disclosure policy
|
||||
The repository SHALL include a SECURITY.md with responsible disclosure instructions.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Scenario: Security contact
|
||||
- **WHEN** a security researcher finds a vulnerability
|
||||
- **THEN** SECURITY.md provides clear instructions for reporting it
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Add a link
Reference in a new issue