Commit graph

6 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Ullrich Schäfer
ec93d37470
Prefix dedupe commit message + set GH_TOKEN for push step
- Commit subject prefixed with "[github-actions]" so the audit trail
  is obvious at a glance in `git log`.
- GH_TOKEN exposed as an env var on the commit step so the PAT is
  also available to any `gh` invocations the step might grow, and the
  token plumbing is visible at the site where the push happens — not
  only up at the checkout step.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 21:06:38 +02:00
Ullrich Schäfer
da56eb2c19
Stop over-claiming the persist-credentials mechanism
The previous comment claimed `git push` reads the token via a git
credential helper wired into $RUNNER_TEMP. I don't actually know that's
how it works end to end — only that checkout stashes the token there
and that subsequent git ops in the same workspace end up authenticating
as the PAT. Describe just the observable contract, not an unverified
internal path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 20:58:26 +02:00
Ullrich Schäfer
5d9ffae38a
Correct comment about where checkout persists the PAT
Current actions/checkout stores the token in $RUNNER_TEMP and wires a
git credential helper, rather than writing the token into .git/config's
http.extraheader. The mechanism that makes `git push` pick up the PAT
is unchanged at the caller's level; the comment was just wrong about
where the secret lives on disk.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 20:56:54 +02:00
Ullrich Schäfer
32ea0f66f5
Make persist-credentials explicit in dedupe checkout
`actions/checkout` has `persist-credentials: true` as its default, but
that default is the load-bearing part of how the later `git push`
authenticates — it's what writes the token into .git/config's
http.extraheader. Making it explicit so a reader of the YAML can see
the mechanism without having to know the action's defaults.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 20:55:47 +02:00
Ullrich Schäfer
e505cfa2b9
Require DEPENDABOT_DEDUPE_TOKEN for the dedupe workflow
Previously the workflow fell back to GITHUB_TOKEN when the PAT wasn't
set — which was silently broken: the push succeeds but GitHub's
anti-workflow-loop safeguard means no new CI runs on the dedupe commit.
Reviewers see stale green CI and the dedupe itself isn't tested until
the next dependabot rebase.

Make the PAT a hard requirement: preflight check fails with a clear
message when the secret is missing, and the checkout step uses it
(which is what persists auth for the later `git push`). Intent is now
obvious from the YAML.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 20:53:57 +02:00
Ullrich Schäfer
f085b78fd7
Auto-dedupe lockfile on dependabot PRs
pnpm install after a dependabot bump keeps duplicate versions of
packages that happen to be pinned via overlapping semver ranges. For
singleton-ish libraries (i18next, react-i18next) that's a latent bug:
the server's module instance and the client's module instance each
hold their own state, and SSR output doesn't match CSR.

#272 ran into this with an i18next patch bump — the bumped version
stayed on some dep paths while other paths kept the old version. A
manual `pnpm dedupe` collapsed them and hydration worked again.

This workflow fires on every dependabot PR, runs `pnpm dedupe`, and
pushes the resulting lockfile update back to the PR branch so CI
runs against the deduped tree.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-19 11:59:33 +02:00