Three Low/Info hardening items from the 2026-06-10 security review.
OAuth/credential log redaction:
- oauth-flow.server.ts logged the raw exception on code-exchange
failure; a provider error can embed the auth code / token response,
which would land in logs + Sentry. Log only e.message now.
- manager.markNeedsRelink bounded the provider-supplied reason string
to 200 chars before logging.
Magic-link account enumeration:
- createMagicToken now returns null (instead of throwing "No account
found for this email") when no account matches; the login route
always responds { step: "magic-link-sent" }, minting a token and
sending mail only for a real account. The public login form can no
longer be used to probe which emails are registered. Registration's
email/username "already in use/taken" messages are intentionally
unchanged — standard signup UX, and the passkey ceremony can't be
made to fake-succeed.
Federation remote-document size cap:
- assertRemoteDocSize rejects an actor/outbox document over 4 MB once
serialized, applied in the ingest fetchJson seam. Fedify owns the
transfer (with its own SSRF + redirect limits) and our poll uses the
authenticated loader for secure-mode instances, so this is a
downstream guard on iteration/persistence, complementing the existing
per-poll item cap.
Tests: assertRemoteDocSize unit cases; a gated (FEDERATION_INTEGRATION=1)
integration test asserting an unsigned POST to /users/:u/inbox is
rejected with 401 — a regression guard for Fedify's signature
verification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds per-process in-memory fixed-window rate limiting (lib/rate-limit.server.ts)
and applies it across /api/auth/login and /api/auth/register:
- All login steps: 30 attempts per IP per minute (defense against
step-fanout flooding).
- finish-passkey: 10 per IP per minute (assertions don't usefully retry
faster).
- magic-link generation: 3 per email per 5 min + 10 per IP per 5 min
(defeats inbox-spam-the-victim + cross-email IP fanout).
- verify-code: 10 per email per 15 min — makes 6-digit code brute force
(10^6 search) infeasible before code expiry.
- /api/auth/register: 10 per IP per hour (legitimate signup completes
in 2-3 requests; sustained churn from one IP is account spam).
Single-instance is fine for the flagship's current topology (one journal
container). When we horizontally scale we revisit with a Postgres- or
Redis-backed store. Buckets self-clean on next read and a 5-minute
background sweep drops stale entries.
Client IP: honors X-Forwarded-For first entry (Caddy in front of the
journal sets it), falls back to a stable "unknown" bucket so the
limiter still bites when the header is missing.
Tests: rate-limit.server.test.ts (8 cases — exhaustion, independent
scopes/keys, remaining countdown, reset window, XFF parsing, fallback,
trimming). Existing auth tests still pass; limits sized to not trip
during the ~7 test cases that all share the "unknown" IP bucket.
Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Addresses 8 issues from the Journal architecture audit:
1. DB indexes on routes.ownerId + activities.ownerId. Listing queries on
these tables were full table scans; adds composite indexes matching
the order-by columns (updatedAt/startedAt/createdAt).
2. Zod validation on /api/auth/register body. Previously the action
destructured request.json() with zero schema validation.
3. N+1 GeoJSON batch fetch collapsed to a single ANY($1::text[]) query
in both routes.server and activities.server.
4. Webhook envelope validation in /api/sync/webhook/:provider.
5. AbortSignal.timeout(30s) on all external fetches (Komoot, Wahoo) via
a new fetchWithTimeout helper in lib/http.server.ts.
6. .limit(100) on listPublicRoutesForOwner / listPublicActivitiesForOwner.
9. Welcome email moved off fire-and-forget onto a pg-boss job with
retryLimit: 3 (send-welcome-email).
10. process.env.ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000" centralized into
lib/config.server.ts::getOrigin() across 14 call sites.
Issues 7 (centralized apiError/auth guards across 60+ route files) and
8 (split .server.ts boundaries across 20+ route files) intentionally
deferred — both are pure refactors that would balloon this PR past
reviewability and warrant their own focused PRs.
Tests added:
- lib/config.server.test.ts (2 cases)
- lib/http.server.test.ts (3 cases — timeout abort, success passthrough,
caller-signal composition)
- routes/api.sync.webhook.$provider.test.ts (6 cases)
- routes/api.auth.register.test.ts (7 cases — schema rejection paths +
the new welcome-email enqueue assertion)
Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two cleanups in one pass:
1. Update import paths app-wide from `~/lib/auth.server` to
`~/lib/auth/session.server` for the four session helpers
(sessionStorage, createSession, getSessionUser, destroySession).
~40 files: 33 simple path swaps where the file imported only session
symbols, 5 splits where it also imported per-method auth functions
(auth.verify.tsx, api.settings.email.ts, activities.\$id.tsx,
routes.\$id.tsx, auth.accept-terms.tsx) — those keep one import
from auth.server (for verifyMagicToken, canView, recordTermsAcceptance,
etc.) and gain a second import from auth/session.server.
Two more files used relative paths and were missed by the first
grep pass (lib/oauth.server.ts and routes/oauth.authorize.tsx) —
migrated too.
The @deprecated re-exports block in auth.server.ts is gone.
2. Rename the new auth files to follow the project's `.server.ts`
convention so Vite/React Router treat them as server-only (they
read process.env.SESSION_SECRET, hit the DB, etc. — must NOT enter
the client bundle):
- auth/session.ts → auth/session.server.ts
- auth/completion.ts → auth/completion.server.ts
- auth/completion.test.ts → auth/completion.server.test.ts
Done with `git mv` so blame is preserved.
Verified: typecheck + lint green; 126 unit tests pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Magic links open in the device browser, not the OAuth in-app browser,
so the session doesn't carry over. A login code lets mobile users
type a 6-digit code from their email into the login page instead.
- Generate 6-digit numeric code alongside magic link token
- Store code in magic_tokens table
- Add verify-code step to login API endpoint
- Show code input UI after magic link is sent
- Include code in email template
- i18n keys for code UI (en + de)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Transactional emails:
- Add nodemailer SMTP email module with dev-mode console logging
- Magic link template and welcome template with HTML + plain text
- Wire sendMagicLink into login flow, sendWelcome into registration
- Update privacy page and deploy docs for SMTP configuration
Planner features:
- No-go areas: draw polygons on map (leaflet-geoman), synced via Yjs,
passed to BRouter as nogos parameter, route recomputes on change
- Session notes: collaborative Y.Text textarea in sidebar tab
- Crash recovery: periodic localStorage save of Yjs state, restore on reconnect
- Rate limit session creation (10/IP/hour) in /new route
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add passkey prompt after magic link login (/?add-passkey=1)
- addPasskeyStart/addPasskeyFinish for existing users
- Dev mode: magic link auto-redirects (returns devLink in response)
- Fix username validation: strip invalid chars instead of HTML pattern
- Separate API routes from page routes for JSON fetch compatibility
All 10 Group 7 tasks complete.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Move auth logic from page actions to dedicated API routes
(/api/auth/register, /api/auth/login) — React Router page
actions don't handle JSON fetch() properly
- Remove server imports from page components
- Verify registration start works end-to-end with PostgreSQL:
WebAuthn challenge generated, user ID created, RP set to localhost
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
