trails/apps
Ullrich Schäfer 01d4832edb
security: authorize and validate presigned upload requests
POST /api/v1/uploads minted an upload key from caller input with no
ownership check, no content-type allowlist, and the raw filename
interpolated into the S3 key.

- Ownership: a caller may only mint upload URLs for a route/activity
  they own, enforced via the branded loadOwnedRoute/loadOwnedActivity
  (404 on miss, no existence leak). Closes writing into another
  user's resource key-space.
- Content type: the request schema now constrains contentType to an
  image/gpx allowlist, so active content (HTML/SVG/JS) that would
  execute if served inline is rejected at the request boundary.
- Filename: sanitizeUploadFilename() reduces the client filename to a
  safe basename (charset-restricted, no path components, no leading
  dots, length-bounded) before it becomes part of the key.

Tests: schema allow/deny + filename sanitization in @trails-cool/api;
handler tests covering owned-success, not-owner 404, disallowed
content-type, and the route-vs-activity ownership branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-10 22:23:14 +02:00
..
journal security: authorize and validate presigned upload requests 2026-06-10 22:23:14 +02:00
mobile Merge branch 'main' into rntl-v14-async-render 2026-06-10 07:43:16 +02:00
planner remove the map and ui shim packages 2026-06-10 07:47:59 +02:00