trails/apps/journal/app/routes/api.sync.webhook.$provider.ts
Ullrich Schäfer 4de6c86d41
fix(journal): architectural audit omnibus
Addresses 8 issues from the Journal architecture audit:

1. DB indexes on routes.ownerId + activities.ownerId. Listing queries on
   these tables were full table scans; adds composite indexes matching
   the order-by columns (updatedAt/startedAt/createdAt).
2. Zod validation on /api/auth/register body. Previously the action
   destructured request.json() with zero schema validation.
3. N+1 GeoJSON batch fetch collapsed to a single ANY($1::text[]) query
   in both routes.server and activities.server.
4. Webhook envelope validation in /api/sync/webhook/:provider.
5. AbortSignal.timeout(30s) on all external fetches (Komoot, Wahoo) via
   a new fetchWithTimeout helper in lib/http.server.ts.
6. .limit(100) on listPublicRoutesForOwner / listPublicActivitiesForOwner.
9. Welcome email moved off fire-and-forget onto a pg-boss job with
   retryLimit: 3 (send-welcome-email).
10. process.env.ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000" centralized into
    lib/config.server.ts::getOrigin() across 14 call sites.

Issues 7 (centralized apiError/auth guards across 60+ route files) and
8 (split .server.ts boundaries across 20+ route files) intentionally
deferred — both are pure refactors that would balloon this PR past
reviewability and warrant their own focused PRs.

Tests added:
- lib/config.server.test.ts (2 cases)
- lib/http.server.test.ts (3 cases — timeout abort, success passthrough,
  caller-signal composition)
- routes/api.sync.webhook.$provider.test.ts (6 cases)
- routes/api.auth.register.test.ts (7 cases — schema rejection paths +
  the new welcome-email enqueue assertion)

Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 10:28:33 +02:00

50 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript

import { data } from "react-router";
import { z } from "zod";
import type { Route } from "./+types/api.sync.webhook.$provider";
import { getManifest } from "~/lib/connected-services";
// Generic webhook envelope. Provider-specific shape validation happens in
// each provider's `parseWebhook`; here we only enforce that the body is a
// JSON object so downstream code never crashes on a malformed payload.
const webhookEnvelope = z.object({ webhook_token: z.string().optional() }).passthrough();
export async function action({ params, request }: Route.ActionArgs) {
if (request.method !== "POST") {
return data({ error: "Method not allowed" }, { status: 405 });
}
const manifest = getManifest(params.provider);
if (!manifest || !manifest.webhookReceiver) {
// Don't reveal provider existence — return 200 silently.
return data({ ok: true });
}
let raw: unknown;
try {
raw = await request.json();
} catch {
return data({ ok: true });
}
const envelope = webhookEnvelope.safeParse(raw);
if (!envelope.success) {
return data({ ok: true });
}
const body = envelope.data;
// Verify webhook token (provider-specific shared secret).
const expectedToken = process.env[`${params.provider.toUpperCase()}_WEBHOOK_TOKEN`];
if (expectedToken && body.webhook_token !== expectedToken) {
return data({ ok: true });
}
const event = manifest.webhookReceiver.parseWebhook(body);
if (!event) return data({ ok: true });
try {
await manifest.webhookReceiver.handle(event);
} catch (e) {
console.error(`Webhook import failed for ${manifest.id}/${event.workoutId}:`, e);
}
return data({ ok: true });
}