5a7bb76ff1
Adds `requireSecret(name, devFallback)` in lib/config.server.ts and `getDatabaseUrl()` in @trails-cool/db. Both: - return the env var when set, - fall back to the dev default in non-production, - throw at boot in production if the env var is missing OR matches the known dev fallback (which would otherwise silently ship a public secret / point at localhost). Applied to: - JWT_SECRET (lib/jwt.server.ts) — was `?? "dev-jwt-secret-change-in-production"` - SESSION_SECRET (lib/auth/session.server.ts) — was `?? "dev-secret-change-in-production"` - DATABASE_URL (server.ts health + boss; packages/db migrate-data) — was `?? "postgres://trails:trails@localhost:5432/trails"` Why: these strings are in the repo and known to attackers. A misconfigured prod deploy that forgot to set them would either run with guessable signing keys (full session/JWT forgery) or connect to a non-existent localhost DB. Better to refuse to start than to silently operate insecurely. Tests: - packages/db/src/get-database-url.test.ts (5 cases) - lib/config.server.test.ts gains `requireSecret` cases (4 new) Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
75 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
75 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
// Cookie session storage. Lives here (separate from auth.server.ts) so
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// the post-verify chokepoint (./completion.ts) can compose it without
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// dragging the entire auth surface in.
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//
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// The legacy import path `~/lib/auth.server` continues to re-export
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// these symbols for backwards compat — see auth.server.ts.
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import { createCookieSessionStorage, redirect } from "react-router";
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import { eq } from "drizzle-orm";
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import { users } from "@trails-cool/db/schema/journal";
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import { getDb } from "../db.ts";
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import { requireSecret } from "../config.server.ts";
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const sessionSecret = requireSecret("SESSION_SECRET", "dev-secret-change-in-production");
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export const sessionStorage = createCookieSessionStorage({
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cookie: {
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name: "__session",
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httpOnly: true,
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secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production",
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sameSite: "lax",
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path: "/",
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maxAge: 60 * 60 * 24 * 30, // 30 days
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secrets: [sessionSecret],
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},
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});
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export async function createSession(userId: string, request: Request) {
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const session = await sessionStorage.getSession(request.headers.get("Cookie"));
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session.set("userId", userId);
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return sessionStorage.commitSession(session);
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}
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export async function getSessionUser(request: Request) {
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const db = getDb();
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const session = await sessionStorage.getSession(request.headers.get("Cookie"));
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const userId = session.get("userId");
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if (!userId) return null;
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const [user] = await db.select().from(users).where(eq(users.id, userId));
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return user ?? null;
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}
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/**
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* Loader/action helper: return the session user or throw a redirect to
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* /auth/login. Centralizes the repeated
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* const user = await getSessionUser(request);
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* if (!user) return redirect("/auth/login");
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* pattern across page loaders and form actions.
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*/
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export async function requireSessionUser(request: Request) {
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const user = await getSessionUser(request);
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if (!user) {
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throw redirect("/auth/login");
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}
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return user;
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}
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/**
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* Same as requireSessionUser but throws a 401 JSON response instead of a
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* redirect. For fetcher/JSON endpoints (`/api/*` non-v1) where redirecting
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* would confuse the client-side caller.
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*/
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export async function requireSessionUserJson(request: Request) {
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const user = await getSessionUser(request);
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if (!user) {
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throw Response.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, { status: 401 });
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}
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return user;
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}
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export async function destroySession(request: Request) {
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const session = await sessionStorage.getSession(request.headers.get("Cookie"));
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return sessionStorage.destroySession(session);
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}
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