4de6c86d41
Addresses 8 issues from the Journal architecture audit: 1. DB indexes on routes.ownerId + activities.ownerId. Listing queries on these tables were full table scans; adds composite indexes matching the order-by columns (updatedAt/startedAt/createdAt). 2. Zod validation on /api/auth/register body. Previously the action destructured request.json() with zero schema validation. 3. N+1 GeoJSON batch fetch collapsed to a single ANY($1::text[]) query in both routes.server and activities.server. 4. Webhook envelope validation in /api/sync/webhook/:provider. 5. AbortSignal.timeout(30s) on all external fetches (Komoot, Wahoo) via a new fetchWithTimeout helper in lib/http.server.ts. 6. .limit(100) on listPublicRoutesForOwner / listPublicActivitiesForOwner. 9. Welcome email moved off fire-and-forget onto a pg-boss job with retryLimit: 3 (send-welcome-email). 10. process.env.ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000" centralized into lib/config.server.ts::getOrigin() across 14 call sites. Issues 7 (centralized apiError/auth guards across 60+ route files) and 8 (split .server.ts boundaries across 20+ route files) intentionally deferred — both are pure refactors that would balloon this PR past reviewability and warrant their own focused PRs. Tests added: - lib/config.server.test.ts (2 cases) - lib/http.server.test.ts (3 cases — timeout abort, success passthrough, caller-signal composition) - routes/api.sync.webhook.$provider.test.ts (6 cases) - routes/api.auth.register.test.ts (7 cases — schema rejection paths + the new welcome-email enqueue assertion) Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
28 lines
855 B
TypeScript
28 lines
855 B
TypeScript
import { SignJWT, jwtVerify } from "jose";
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import { getOrigin } from "./config.server.ts";
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const JWT_SECRET = new TextEncoder().encode(
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process.env.JWT_SECRET ?? "dev-jwt-secret-change-in-production",
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);
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const ISSUER = getOrigin();
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export async function createRouteToken(routeId: string, permissions: string[] = ["read", "write"]): Promise<string> {
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return new SignJWT({ route_id: routeId, permissions })
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.setProtectedHeader({ alg: "HS256" })
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.setIssuer(ISSUER)
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.setExpirationTime("7d")
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.setIssuedAt()
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.sign(JWT_SECRET);
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}
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export async function verifyRouteToken(token: string): Promise<{ routeId: string; permissions: string[] }> {
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const { payload } = await jwtVerify(token, JWT_SECRET, {
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issuer: ISSUER,
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});
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return {
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routeId: payload.route_id as string,
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permissions: payload.permissions as string[],
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};
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}
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