trails/openspec/specs/journal-auth/spec.md
Ullrich Schäfer 0cf87b72ab
Fix medium-severity spec drift across 17 specs
- authentication-methods: document completeAuth mode param ("redirect"|"json");
  clarify add-passkey nudge (no dismiss mechanism, disappears on passkey add)
- journal-auth: session maxAge is 30 days; terms allow-list uses /legal/ prefix
  matching (broader than fixed list of paths)
- session-notes: mark awareness isolation and UndoManager isolation as not yet
  implemented (shared instances in current code)
- activity-feed: add fan-out scenario for visibility change to public
- explore: note that ?perPage is not yet implemented (hardcoded page size)
- multi-day-routes: add per-day GPX track split scenario (splitByDays option);
  document overnight vs isDayBreak naming gap
- osm-poi-overlays: debounce is 800ms + 2000ms min interval (not 500ms);
  retry is not automatic (fires on next viewport change)
- brouter-integration: rate limit corrected to 300/hour; add segment-cache
  requirement (client caches per-pair segments)
- wahoo-route-push: OAuth state shape uses camelCase (returnTo, pushAfter
  object) not snake_case with push_after boolean
- komoot-import: document noop adapter / ConnectedServiceManager bypass;
  note four Komoot-specific routes that bypass the generic OAuth framework
- background-jobs: exponential backoff not wired (retryLimit only); add SIGINT
- connected-services: add revoked status; name ConnectionNotActiveError
- infrastructure: add INTEGRATION_SECRET and SENTRY_DSN to env var lists;
  split secret decryption scenario by workflow (cd-apps vs cd-infra)
- secret-management: correct CD decryption — cd-apps only decrypts app.env;
  cd-infra decrypts both
- transactional-emails: welcome email is async (pg-boss job); magic-link email
  includes 6-digit numeric code
- journal-route-detail: websites are https: links (not mailto:); opening_hours
  is also displayed
- local-dev-environment: add mobile app (Expo) dev commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 11:11:31 +02:00

5.8 KiB

journal-auth Specification

Purpose

Session management and the terms-of-service consent gate for the Journal app. The credentials a user authenticates with (passkeys, magic links, magic codes) and the registration UX live in authentication-methods; OAuth tokens for third-party services (Wahoo etc.) live in connected-services. This spec is the cross-cutting layer: cookie sessions, the Terms-version gate that wraps every authenticated request, and the rules for safely returning users to where they came from.

Requirements

The Journal SHALL identify signed-in users via a server-set HTTP cookie (__session) that carries a serialized JSON payload containing userId. The cookie SHALL be HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax, signed with the server secret, and have a maxAge of 30 days. Anonymous browsers SHALL render the public surface (anonymous home, public profiles, public routes/activities) without a session cookie present.

  • WHEN any authentication path (passkey finish, magic-link verify, code verify) succeeds
  • THEN the response carries a Set-Cookie: __session=... header binding the resulting userId to the browser

Scenario: Anonymous request renders public surface

  • WHEN a request arrives without __session (or with one that fails to verify)
  • THEN loaders treat the request as anonymous; routes that require auth either redirect to /auth/login or render the public layout per their own spec

Requirement: Terms acknowledgement at signup

The registration form SHALL require explicit acknowledgement of the Terms of Service before an account can be created.

Scenario: Checkbox required

  • WHEN a user views the registration form
  • THEN they see a required checkbox labeled "I have read and agree to the Terms of Service, including that trails.cool is in alpha and my data may be reset"
  • AND the checkbox label links to the Terms page

Scenario: Cannot submit without acknowledgement

  • WHEN a user attempts to register without checking the acknowledgement box
  • THEN the form blocks submission and shows a validation message

Scenario: Acknowledgement recorded

  • WHEN a user successfully registers
  • THEN the current timestamp is stored in users.terms_accepted_at
  • AND the version identifier of the Terms the user saw is stored in users.terms_version

Scenario: Missing version rejected

  • WHEN a registration request arrives without a non-empty termsVersion field
  • THEN the server responds with HTTP 400 and does not create a user

Requirement: Re-accept updated Terms on next visit

Logged-in users whose stored terms_version does not match the currently-published version SHALL be prompted to accept the current Terms before accessing any non-allow-listed page.

Scenario: Stale version redirects to accept-terms page

  • WHEN a logged-in user whose users.terms_version is NULL or differs from the current TERMS_VERSION requests any path not in the allow-list
  • THEN the server redirects them to /auth/accept-terms?returnTo=<original path>

Scenario: Allow-list keeps Terms and logout reachable

  • WHEN the same user requests any path under /legal/ (e.g. /legal/terms, /legal/privacy, /legal/imprint), /auth/accept-terms, or /auth/logout
  • THEN the request is served normally without being redirected

Note: the allow-list uses prefix matching (/legal/ prefix covers all current and future legal pages); it is not a fixed list of individual paths.

Scenario: Successful re-acceptance updates both fields

  • WHEN a user submits the acceptance form with the required checkbox ticked
  • THEN the server updates users.terms_version to the current version and users.terms_accepted_at to the current timestamp, then redirects to the returnTo path (or /)
  • WHEN the form is submitted without the checkbox ticked
  • THEN the server responds with HTTP 400 and does not update the user row

Scenario: returnTo is restricted to same-origin paths

  • WHEN a returnTo value is not a same-origin absolute path (missing leading /, or starting with //)
  • THEN the server redirects to / instead, preventing open-redirect abuse

Requirement: Terms gate applies to bearer-token API requests

Authenticated API requests carrying an OAuth2 bearer token SHALL be subject to the same Terms-version gate as cookie-session requests. When the authenticated user's stored terms_version is NULL or differs from the current TERMS_VERSION, the API chokepoint (requireApiUser) SHALL reject the request with HTTP 403 and a structured JSON body { error, code: "TERMS_OUTDATED", currentTermsVersion: <current> } instead of returning the resource. Cookie-session web traffic continues to be handled by the root-loader redirect to /auth/accept-terms; only the API path uses the structured 403.

Scenario: Stale bearer token receives structured 403

  • WHEN a request to /api/v1/* arrives with a valid bearer token whose user has terms_version NULL or different from the current TERMS_VERSION
  • THEN the server responds with HTTP 403 and JSON { error: <message>, code: "TERMS_OUTDATED", currentTermsVersion: <current> }
  • AND the requested resource is not returned

Scenario: Up-to-date bearer token is allowed through

  • WHEN a request to /api/v1/* arrives with a valid bearer token whose user's terms_version matches the current TERMS_VERSION
  • THEN the request proceeds normally

Scenario: Anonymous API request still 401

  • WHEN a request to /api/v1/* arrives without a bearer token (or with an invalid one)
  • THEN the server responds with HTTP 401 UNAUTHORIZED as before — the Terms check only applies after authentication succeeds