trails/openspec/specs/authentication-methods/spec.md
Ullrich Schäfer 0cf87b72ab
Fix medium-severity spec drift across 17 specs
- authentication-methods: document completeAuth mode param ("redirect"|"json");
  clarify add-passkey nudge (no dismiss mechanism, disappears on passkey add)
- journal-auth: session maxAge is 30 days; terms allow-list uses /legal/ prefix
  matching (broader than fixed list of paths)
- session-notes: mark awareness isolation and UndoManager isolation as not yet
  implemented (shared instances in current code)
- activity-feed: add fan-out scenario for visibility change to public
- explore: note that ?perPage is not yet implemented (hardcoded page size)
- multi-day-routes: add per-day GPX track split scenario (splitByDays option);
  document overnight vs isDayBreak naming gap
- osm-poi-overlays: debounce is 800ms + 2000ms min interval (not 500ms);
  retry is not automatic (fires on next viewport change)
- brouter-integration: rate limit corrected to 300/hour; add segment-cache
  requirement (client caches per-pair segments)
- wahoo-route-push: OAuth state shape uses camelCase (returnTo, pushAfter
  object) not snake_case with push_after boolean
- komoot-import: document noop adapter / ConnectedServiceManager bypass;
  note four Komoot-specific routes that bypass the generic OAuth framework
- background-jobs: exponential backoff not wired (retryLimit only); add SIGINT
- connected-services: add revoked status; name ConnectionNotActiveError
- infrastructure: add INTEGRATION_SECRET and SENTRY_DSN to env var lists;
  split secret decryption scenario by workflow (cd-apps vs cd-infra)
- secret-management: correct CD decryption — cd-apps only decrypts app.env;
  cd-infra decrypts both
- transactional-emails: welcome email is async (pg-boss job); magic-link email
  includes 6-digit numeric code
- journal-route-detail: websites are https: links (not mailto:); opening_hours
  is also displayed
- local-dev-environment: add mobile app (Expo) dev commands

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 11:11:31 +02:00

11 KiB

authentication-methods Specification

Purpose

The credentials a user can authenticate with on the Journal: passkeys (WebAuthn) and email magic links / 6-digit codes. Covers registration, login, adding a passkey to an existing account, and the UX toggle on the register/login forms that lets users pick the method that works in their browser. Session management, terms acceptance, and the cookie session cookie itself live in journal-auth — this spec only covers what proves identity.

Requirements

Requirement: Passkey-based registration

The Journal SHALL support WebAuthn passkey registration as the primary auth method when the browser advertises browserSupportsWebAuthn(). Registration SHALL create the user row, generate a credential, and start a session in one HTTP round-trip pair (step: "start" followed by step: "finish").

Scenario: Browser supports WebAuthn

  • WHEN a visitor completes the Register form with a browser that supports WebAuthn
  • THEN the form prompts for a passkey, the credential is stored in credentials, the users row is created with terms_version and terms_accepted_at, and a session cookie is issued

Scenario: Browser does not support WebAuthn

  • WHEN the browser reports browserSupportsWebAuthn() === false
  • THEN the Register form auto-switches to the magic-link/code path; the passkey button is not rendered

The Journal SHALL support a passwordless registration alternative: the user submits email + username, the server creates the account and a 15-minute magic token (with both a click-through link and a 6-digit code), and the user verifies through either path. Used in production over real email; in development the link/code is logged to the server console ([Register Magic Link] ...) so the dev can test without a mail transport.

  • WHEN a visitor submits the Register form with step: "register-magic-link" in production
  • THEN the server inserts the user row, creates a magic_tokens row with both token and code, sends the email (link + 6-digit code), and the form renders a "check your email" confirmation
  • WHEN the same flow runs with NODE_ENV !== "production"
  • THEN the server logs [Register Magic Link] <email>: <link> (code: <code>) to stdout instead of sending email, and the API response includes both devLink and code so the dev can paste either

Scenario: Verify via 6-digit code on registration

  • WHEN the new user enters the 6-digit code on the post-submit form
  • THEN POST /api/auth/login { step: "verify-code", email, code } validates against the same magic_tokens row (default purpose = "login"), marks it used, and starts a session — registration and first login share the verify-code endpoint
  • WHEN the user clicks the link delivered to their inbox (or to the dev console)
  • THEN /auth/verify?token=... validates the same row, marks it used, and starts a session

Requirement: Passkey login

The Journal SHALL support WebAuthn passkey login on /auth/login. The page SHALL default to the passkey method when browserSupportsWebAuthn() returns true; otherwise it SHALL pre-select the magic-link method.

Scenario: Passkey login on a browser with a registered credential

  • WHEN a returning user clicks "Sign in with passkey" on a browser that already holds the credential
  • THEN WebAuthn authentication completes, the matching credentials row is verified, and a session cookie is issued

Scenario: Passkey not found locally

  • WHEN the browser does not present any matching credential during the WebAuthn ceremony
  • THEN the login page surfaces the auth.passkeyNotFound error and the user can switch to the magic-link/code flow

The Journal SHALL support email-based login as the universal fallback. The login form SHALL include a "Use magic link instead" toggle (for users with WebAuthn but no local credential), which surfaces an email-only form; submitting it sends a magic link (production) or surfaces devLink + code (dev), and a 6-digit code form lets the user paste the code instead of clicking the link.

  • WHEN a registered user submits their email under step: "magic-link"
  • THEN a magic_tokens row is created with both token and code, and either the email is sent (prod) or devLink + code are returned (dev) plus [Magic Link] <email>: <link> (code: <code>) is logged to stdout

Scenario: Verify via 6-digit code

  • WHEN the user submits step: "verify-code" with the email and the 6-digit code
  • THEN the matching magic_tokens row is validated (not expired, not used), marked used, and a session cookie is issued
  • WHEN the login page detects browserSupportsWebAuthn() === false
  • THEN the page auto-selects magic-link mode and does not render the passkey button

Requirement: Method-toggle UX on register and login

The register form and the login form SHALL both render a small text toggle that lets the user manually switch between passkey and magic-link mode when both are available, mirroring the same UX on both surfaces.

Scenario: Toggle on register

  • WHEN a passkey-capable browser visits /auth/register
  • THEN the form starts in passkey mode and renders a "Use magic link instead" link below the submit button; clicking it switches the form to the magic-link path

Scenario: Toggle on login

  • WHEN a passkey-capable browser visits /auth/login
  • THEN the form starts in passkey mode and renders the same toggle to switch to magic-link mode

Requirement: Add passkey to an existing account

A signed-in user SHALL be able to add an additional passkey to their account from the Security settings page (/settings/security) or from the post-login /?add-passkey=1 prompt. The flow SHALL reuse the WebAuthn registration ceremony but bind the credential to the existing users.id rather than creating a new account.

Scenario: Add passkey from settings

  • WHEN a signed-in user clicks "Add passkey" on /settings/security
  • THEN a WebAuthn registration ceremony runs against the existing user id and a new row is inserted in credentials linked to that user

Scenario: Post-login add-passkey nudge

  • WHEN a user who has zero registered passkeys lands on /?add-passkey=1
  • THEN the home page surfaces an "Add a passkey for faster sign-in" prompt
  • AND once the user adds a passkey the prompt disappears (there is no separate dismiss/suppress mechanism)

Requirement: Passkey deletion

A signed-in user SHALL be able to remove a passkey from their account via the Security settings page (/settings/security). The Journal SHALL prevent deletion of the user's last remaining passkey if no alternative auth method (a verified email for magic-link login) is available, to avoid lock-out.

Scenario: Delete one of multiple passkeys

  • WHEN a user with 2+ passkeys removes one via /api/settings/passkey/delete
  • THEN the matching credentials row is deleted; remaining passkeys stay valid

Scenario: Last-passkey safety net (verified email is the fallback)

  • WHEN a user attempts to delete their only remaining passkey
  • THEN the action proceeds because magic-link login by email is always available — passkey deletion does not lock the user out

Requirement: Single web auth completion chokepoint

Every successful web authentication flow — passkey register-finish, passkey login-finish, magic-link 6-digit-code verify, magic-link click-through verify — SHALL complete by calling a single completeAuth function at apps/journal/app/lib/auth/completion.server.ts. The function SHALL be the sole place where a successful web authentication mints the cookie session and constructs the redirect to returnTo (or / when absent or rejected).

Per-method identity verification (WebAuthn ceremony, magic-token consumption, 6-digit-code consumption) SHALL run in its own function and produce a userId before completeAuth is invoked. completeAuth SHALL NOT know how identity was proved.

completeAuth supports two response modes via an optional mode parameter: "redirect" (default, for browser flows — returns a Response with Set-Cookie + Location) and "json" (for API/mobile flows — returns a JSON body with the session token). All web authentication scenarios use "redirect"; the "json" mode is used by the OAuth2/PKCE mobile code-exchange flow.

Terms recording happens at user creation time inside the per-method registration functions (finishRegistration for passkey, registerWithMagicLink for magic-link), not inside completeAuth. The Terms gate (root-loader redirect for cookie sessions; requireApiUser 403 for bearer-token API requests) SHALL remain the enforcement point for stale terms_version.

OAuth-code issuance at /oauth/authorize SHALL NOT be routed through completeAuth — that flow operates on an already-authenticated user and shares only the trailing redirect, not the full sequence.

Scenario: Passkey register-finish completes through the chokepoint

  • WHEN a visitor submits a successful WebAuthn step: "finish" registration response
  • THEN the route handler verifies the credential and creates the user row (with terms recorded) inside finishRegistration, then calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • AND completeAuth mints the session cookie and returns a Response redirecting to returnTo (or /)

Scenario: Passkey login-finish completes through the chokepoint

  • WHEN a visitor submits a successful WebAuthn step: "finish-passkey" login response
  • THEN the route handler verifies the credential and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • AND completeAuth mints the session cookie and returns a Response redirecting to returnTo (or /)
  • WHEN a visitor submits a valid 6-digit code via step: "verify-code"
  • THEN the route handler consumes the magic token (marks used_at) and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • WHEN a visitor opens /auth/verify?token=<token> with a valid, unused, unexpired token
  • THEN the route handler consumes the magic token and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })

Scenario: returnTo is sanitized inside completeAuth

  • WHEN completeAuth is called with a returnTo value that is not a same-origin absolute path (e.g. starts with //, an absolute URL, or is malformed)
  • THEN the redirect target falls back to / rather than honoring the unsafe value
  • AND every caller benefits from the same check rather than reimplementing it