Final step (task 9.4) of the BRouter relocation. The change is moved to openspec/changes/archive/2026-04-24-relocate-brouter-to-dedicated-host/ and the four delta specs (brouter-integration, infrastructure, observability, security-hardening) are merged into the main specs: + 6 added requirements ~ 4 modified requirements The two intentionally-unchecked tasks are 2.2 (obsoleted, see crossed-out note) and 9.4 itself (this archive). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
3.7 KiB
Purpose
Security headers, scanner path blocking, secret scanning, dependency auditing, non-root containers, and vulnerability disclosure policy.
Requirements
Requirement: Security response headers
All HTTP responses SHALL include security headers to protect against common web attacks.
Scenario: HSTS header
- WHEN a browser receives a response from trails.cool
- THEN the response includes
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload
Scenario: Content sniffing prevention
- WHEN a browser receives a response
- THEN the response includes
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
Scenario: Clickjacking prevention
- WHEN a browser receives a response
- THEN the response includes
X-Frame-Options: DENY
Requirement: Scanner path blocking
Known vulnerability scanner paths SHALL be blocked at the reverse proxy level before reaching the application.
Scenario: Env file scanner
- WHEN a request is made to
/.env,/.env.local,/.env.prod, or similar paths - THEN Caddy returns 403 without forwarding to the application
Scenario: Git config scanner
- WHEN a request is made to
/.git/configor/.git/HEAD - THEN Caddy returns 403 without forwarding to the application
Requirement: Secret scanning in CI
The CI pipeline SHALL scan commits for accidentally committed secrets.
Scenario: Secret detected
- WHEN a PR contains a committed API key, token, or password
- THEN the CI pipeline fails with a clear message indicating the leaked secret
Scenario: Known public values allowed
- WHEN a known-public value (e.g., Sentry DSN) is committed
- THEN gitleaks allows it via the
.gitleaks.tomlallowlist
Requirement: Dependency vulnerability scanning
The CI pipeline SHALL check for known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
Scenario: High severity vulnerability
- WHEN a dependency has a high or critical vulnerability advisory
- THEN the CI pipeline fails
Requirement: Non-root Docker containers
Application containers SHALL run as a non-root user.
Scenario: Container user
- WHEN a container starts
- THEN the process runs as a non-root user (not UID 0)
Requirement: Vulnerability disclosure policy
The repository SHALL include a SECURITY.md with responsible disclosure instructions.
Scenario: Security contact
- WHEN a security researcher finds a vulnerability
- THEN SECURITY.md provides clear instructions for reporting it
Requirement: BRouter access control
The BRouter service SHALL be reachable only from the flagship host over a private Hetzner vSwitch, and every request SHALL carry a valid X-BRouter-Auth shared-secret header. The token SHALL be stored only in SOPS-encrypted secrets and GitHub Actions secrets, never committed in cleartext.
Scenario: Request from public internet
- WHEN an attacker sends a request to the BRouter host's public IP on the BRouter service port
- THEN the host firewall refuses the connection
Scenario: Request from vSwitch without token
- WHEN a request arrives on the BRouter host over the vSwitch without a valid
X-BRouter-Authheader - THEN the Caddy sidecar responds with HTTP 403 and BRouter never sees the request
Scenario: Token storage
- WHEN
BROUTER_AUTH_TOKENis added or rotated - THEN the token is written only to
infrastructure/secrets.infra.env(SOPS-encrypted) and to the GitHub Actions secret store, and is never committed in cleartext to the repository
Scenario: Token rotation
- WHEN the token is rotated
- THEN operators update SOPS, redeploy the Planner (new token in outbound header), and redeploy the Caddy sidecar (new token in the matcher), in that order, with zero downtime