Addresses 8 issues from the Journal architecture audit: 1. DB indexes on routes.ownerId + activities.ownerId. Listing queries on these tables were full table scans; adds composite indexes matching the order-by columns (updatedAt/startedAt/createdAt). 2. Zod validation on /api/auth/register body. Previously the action destructured request.json() with zero schema validation. 3. N+1 GeoJSON batch fetch collapsed to a single ANY($1::text[]) query in both routes.server and activities.server. 4. Webhook envelope validation in /api/sync/webhook/:provider. 5. AbortSignal.timeout(30s) on all external fetches (Komoot, Wahoo) via a new fetchWithTimeout helper in lib/http.server.ts. 6. .limit(100) on listPublicRoutesForOwner / listPublicActivitiesForOwner. 9. Welcome email moved off fire-and-forget onto a pg-boss job with retryLimit: 3 (send-welcome-email). 10. process.env.ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:3000" centralized into lib/config.server.ts::getOrigin() across 14 call sites. Issues 7 (centralized apiError/auth guards across 60+ route files) and 8 (split .server.ts boundaries across 20+ route files) intentionally deferred — both are pure refactors that would balloon this PR past reviewability and warrant their own focused PRs. Tests added: - lib/config.server.test.ts (2 cases) - lib/http.server.test.ts (3 cases — timeout abort, success passthrough, caller-signal composition) - routes/api.sync.webhook.$provider.test.ts (6 cases) - routes/api.auth.register.test.ts (7 cases — schema rejection paths + the new welcome-email enqueue assertion) Full repo: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, pnpm test all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
50 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
50 lines
1.6 KiB
TypeScript
import { data } from "react-router";
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import { z } from "zod";
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import type { Route } from "./+types/api.sync.webhook.$provider";
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import { getManifest } from "~/lib/connected-services";
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// Generic webhook envelope. Provider-specific shape validation happens in
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// each provider's `parseWebhook`; here we only enforce that the body is a
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// JSON object so downstream code never crashes on a malformed payload.
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const webhookEnvelope = z.object({ webhook_token: z.string().optional() }).passthrough();
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export async function action({ params, request }: Route.ActionArgs) {
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if (request.method !== "POST") {
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return data({ error: "Method not allowed" }, { status: 405 });
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}
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const manifest = getManifest(params.provider);
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if (!manifest || !manifest.webhookReceiver) {
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// Don't reveal provider existence — return 200 silently.
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return data({ ok: true });
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}
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let raw: unknown;
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try {
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raw = await request.json();
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} catch {
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return data({ ok: true });
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}
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const envelope = webhookEnvelope.safeParse(raw);
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if (!envelope.success) {
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return data({ ok: true });
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}
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const body = envelope.data;
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// Verify webhook token (provider-specific shared secret).
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const expectedToken = process.env[`${params.provider.toUpperCase()}_WEBHOOK_TOKEN`];
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if (expectedToken && body.webhook_token !== expectedToken) {
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return data({ ok: true });
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}
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const event = manifest.webhookReceiver.parseWebhook(body);
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if (!event) return data({ ok: true });
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try {
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await manifest.webhookReceiver.handle(event);
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} catch (e) {
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console.error(`Webhook import failed for ${manifest.id}/${event.workoutId}:`, e);
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}
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return data({ ok: true });
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}
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