trails/openspec/changes/archive/2026-05-08-unify-auth-completion/specs/authentication-methods/spec.md
Ullrich Schäfer e268aeec10
Archive unify-auth-completion + sync spec delta (task 5.1)
Applies the ADDED requirement from
openspec/changes/unify-auth-completion/specs/authentication-methods/
into openspec/specs/authentication-methods/spec.md:

- Single web auth completion chokepoint (completeAuth at
  apps/journal/app/lib/auth/completion.server.ts) with five scenarios
  covering passkey register/login finish, magic-link verify-code,
  magic-link click-through, and returnTo sanitization.

Path in the synced requirement is .server.ts (the post-rename name),
not the .ts the delta originally captured.

Change moved to openspec/changes/archive/2026-05-08-unify-auth-completion/.
15/15 tasks complete.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-08 03:02:51 +02:00

3.1 KiB

ADDED Requirements

Requirement: Single web auth completion chokepoint

Every successful web authentication flow — passkey register-finish, passkey login-finish, magic-link 6-digit-code verify, magic-link click-through verify — SHALL complete by calling a single completeAuth function at apps/journal/app/lib/auth/completion.ts. The function SHALL be the sole place where a successful web authentication mints the cookie session and constructs the redirect to returnTo (or / when absent or rejected).

Per-method identity verification (WebAuthn ceremony, magic-token consumption, 6-digit-code consumption) SHALL run in its own function and produce a userId before completeAuth is invoked. completeAuth SHALL NOT know how identity was proved.

Terms recording happens at user creation time inside the per-method registration functions (finishRegistration for passkey, registerWithMagicLink for magic-link), not inside completeAuth. The Terms gate (root-loader redirect for cookie sessions; requireApiUser 403 for bearer-token API requests) SHALL remain the enforcement point for stale terms_version.

OAuth-code issuance at /oauth/authorize SHALL NOT be routed through completeAuth — that flow operates on an already-authenticated user and shares only the trailing redirect, not the full sequence.

Scenario: Passkey register-finish completes through the chokepoint

  • WHEN a visitor submits a successful WebAuthn step: "finish" registration response
  • THEN the route handler verifies the credential and creates the user row (with terms recorded) inside finishRegistration, then calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • AND completeAuth mints the session cookie and returns a Response redirecting to returnTo (or /)

Scenario: Passkey login-finish completes through the chokepoint

  • WHEN a visitor submits a successful WebAuthn step: "finish-passkey" login response
  • THEN the route handler verifies the credential and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • AND completeAuth mints the session cookie and returns a Response redirecting to returnTo (or /)
  • WHEN a visitor submits a valid 6-digit code via step: "verify-code"
  • THEN the route handler consumes the magic token (marks used_at) and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })
  • WHEN a visitor opens /auth/verify?token=<token> with a valid, unused, unexpired token
  • THEN the route handler consumes the magic token and calls completeAuth({ userId, request, returnTo })

Scenario: returnTo is sanitized inside completeAuth

  • WHEN completeAuth is called with a returnTo value that is not a same-origin absolute path (e.g. starts with //, an absolute URL, or is malformed)
  • THEN the redirect target falls back to / rather than honoring the unsafe value
  • AND every caller benefits from the same check rather than reimplementing it